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Condorcet (1785) proposed that a majority vote drawn from individual, independent and fallible
(but not totally uninformed) opinions provides near-perfect accuracy if the number of voters is ade-
quately large. Research in social psychology has since then repeatedly demonstrated that collectives
can and do fail more often than expected by Condorcet. Since human collective decisions often
follow from exchange of opinions, these failures provide an exquisite opportunity to understand
human communication of metacognitive conﬁdence. This question can be addressed by recasting
collective decision-making as an information-integration problem similar to multisensory (cross-
modal) perception. Previous research in systems neuroscience shows that one brain can integrate
information from multiple senses nearly optimally. Inverting the question, we ask: under what
conditions can two brains integrate information about one sensory modality optimally? We review
recent work that has taken this approach and report discoveries about the quantitative limits of col-
lective perceptual decision-making, and the role of the mode of communication and feedback in
collective decision-making. We propose that shared metacognitive conﬁdence conveys the strength
of an individual’s opinion and its reliability inseparably. We further suggest that a functional role of
shared metacognition is to provide substitute signals in situations where outcome is necessary for
learning but unavailable or impossible to establish.
Keywords: metacognition; collective decision-making; signal detection;
cooperative behaviour; feedback; conﬁdence
1. INTRODUCTION
In The extraordinary and popular delusions and madness
of crowds, Charles Mackay [1] chronicled a colourful
and proliﬁc history of humankind’s collective follies.
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Mackay’s decision to doubt and re-examine the popu-
lar belief that ‘two heads are better than one’ has
since then guided numerous disciplines interested in
human collective decision-making from political
sciences to economics and social psychology. Mackay’s
negative revisionism was preceded by a wave of opti-
mistic trust in mass decisions initiated by the
Marquis de Condorcet [2], a mathematician and pol-
itical philosopher of the French revolution.
Condorcet’s jury theorem elegantly proved that a
simple‘democratic’majorityvotedrawnfromtheaggre-
gated opinions of individual, independent and fallible
(but not totally uninformed) lay-people provides near-
perfect accuracy if the number of voters is adequately
large [2].
At a local livestock fair in Plymouth, early in the
twentieth century, Francis Galton [3] found strong
empirical support for Condorcet’s theoretical prop-
osition. At a weight-judging contest, participants
estimated the weight of a chosen live ox after it had
been slaughtered and dressed. Participants entered
the competition by privately writing their estimate on
a ticket and submitting it to the fair organizers. The
winner was the one who submitted the most-accurate
estimate. After the competition, Galton collected
the approximately 800 submitted tickets and demon-
strated in a paper [3] that, indeed, the simple
average of the estimates of the entire crowd was even
more accurate than the winner. The most striking
aspect of this ﬁnding was that the majority of
participants had very little specialized knowledge of
butchery; yet, their contribution to the average opinion
outperformed the best expert opinion. Theoretically
and empirically, masses ruled supreme. So, can we
dismiss Mackay’s [1] worries? Deﬁnitely not!
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psychology has examined collective decision-making
and, indeed, numerous examples of collective failure
have been discovered [4]. Indeed, this research clearly
shows that Condorcet’s assumption about the inde-
pendence of individual opinions—which was neatly
satisﬁed in the weight-judging contest—is often not
applicable to real-world situations of collective
behaviour [5]. However, by carefully identifying the
determinants of collective failure, we can use Mackay’s
[1] insight, thatcollective beneﬁt isthe exception rather
than the rule, to better understand the nature of human
social interaction. To rephrase, one could ask which
features of interpersonal communication and/or
interaction contribute to collective failures.
In this paper, we ﬁrst review previous work that has
addressed this question by recasting collective decision-
making as an ‘information integration’ problem similar
to multisensory (cross-modal) perception. In multi-
sensory perception, the observer combines information
from different sensory modalities (e.g. vision and
touch) taking into account the reliability (or variance)
of each modality such that the multisensory decision is
more strongly inﬂuenced by the sensory modality with
the higher reliability (i.e. lower variance) [6–8]. By ana-
logy, collective decision-making also requires combining
information but from different observers. We argue that
establishing the reliabilityof this information constitutes
an integral part of information integration at the
collective level.
Using collective decision-making in the perceptual
domain as a framework, we describe and compare two
models of how we communicate and integrate our
individual perceptions and their reliability [9,10]. Both
models posit that observers convey the reliability of
theirindividualperceptionsbycommunicatingtheircon-
ﬁdence in their perceptual decisions, i.e. their
metacognitive awareness of their perceptual decisions.
However, the models make very different assumptions
abouttheexactcontentofthecommunicatedconﬁdence
andthe computational strategy bywhich observerscom-
binethemtoarriveatacollectivedecision.Wewillreview
thepredictionsofeachmodelandassesstheminthelight
oftheexistingliterature.Wewillalsopresentnewempiri-
caldatarevealingfurtherfeaturesofcollectiveperceptual
decision-makingbyconﬁdencesharing.Wewillplacethe
ﬁndings from collective perceptual decision-making in
the wider context of group decision-making [4]a n d
discussapossiblefunctionalsocialroleformetacognitive
awareness. Finally, we will brieﬂy compare and attempt
to connect our current understanding of metacognition
at the levels of brain mechanism, individual behaviour
and social interaction.
2. COLLECTIVE PERCEPTUAL
DECISION-MAKING
Qodrat and Jalal (ﬁgure 1) are two cricket umpires.
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The bowler (ﬁgure 1, top) has just made his run and
bowled the ball; but the two umpires disagree about
whether his foot crossed the line or not. Although
Qodrat has announced a ‘no ball’, Jalal contends that
there was no such error. Let us stop here and examine
the situation. We can think of each umpire’s visual
perception of the events as represented in the brain
by a normal distribution with a mean (mQ for Qodrat
and mJ for Jalal) and a standard deviation (sQ and
sJ). This normal distribution could correspond to,
for example, the ﬁring pattern of neurons in each
umpire’s early visual cortex. The umpire’s decision
about whether the bowler’s foot landed ahead of
(e.g. Qodrat, mQ . 0) or behind (e.g. Jalal, mJ , 0)
the line is given by the signed mean of the distribution.
The standard deviation of each distribution relates to
the noisiness of the umpire’s perception. As such, a
reliable percept would be characterized by a large
mean (e.g. Jalal) and a small standard deviation (e.g.
Qodrat). But how do Qodrat and Jalal resolve their dis-
agreement and come to a joint decision? The simple
formulation of the situation given above is the basis
of two recent models [9,10] of collective perceptual
decision-making.
Sorkin et al.[ 10] proposed that, by communicating
their conﬁdence in their perceptual decision, the
umpires are in fact communicating their, respective,
m and s separately and distinctly to one another. As
we will see further below, the distinctness of these
two pieces of information is a critical feature of this
model. To make an optimal collective decision (i.e.
to minimize the chances of error given each umpires’
decision noise), the two umpires (i.e. the group) some-
how evaluate the term ðmQ=s2
QÞþð mJ=s2
JÞ and take its
sign as their joint decision. Deﬁning perceptual sensi-
tivity (s) as inversely proportional to standard
deviation (such that s ¼ k/s; where k represents a con-
stant term; see equation (3.3) below for the exact
deﬁnition of slope, the group’s sensitivity, Sgroup,i s
no ball!
Qodrat Jalal
ahead
behind
ahead
behind
s J
sQ
mJ mQ
correct! ?
Figure 1. Two cricket umpires, Qodrat and Jalal, disagree
about whether the bowler crossed the line. The low-quality
image depicting the bowler was intentionally constructed
to indicate the perceptual noise. Each umpire’s individual
decisions are based on his respective noisy perceptual rep-
resentation, which we model as a Gaussian distribution.
The ﬁgure is inspired by Ernst [11].
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sgroup ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s2
Q þ s2
J
q
: ð2:1Þ
In a standard sensory signal-detection task per-
formed by individuals and groups in separate
experiments, Sorkin et al.[ 10] showed that groups
achieved a robust collective beneﬁt over and above
the sensitivities of the constituent individuals as
measured when these individuals performed the task
in isolation. Their model was able to predict the collec-
tive beneﬁts accrued by the groups. Interestingly, their
model could readily be extended to groups larger than
two people. However, as group size expanded, group
performance did not improve as fast as predicted by
the model, indicating that, perhaps, different group
dynamics may be at work as group size increases.
Sorkin et al.’s [10] model is conceptually identical to
the model used in multisensory perception research to
describe how information from different sensory mod-
alities, such as touch and vision, are combined within
the brain of one observer [6,8,13]. That dyads
performed as well as equation (2.1) would lead to the
uncomfortable conclusion that communication
between brains is as reliable and high ﬁdelity as com-
munication within the same brain. Moreover, this
formulation implies that groups would never do worse
than individuals. Recalling the case of Condorcet,
Mackay and Galton, once again, groups seemed to be
doing much better (theoretically and empirically)
than common sense would suggest.
Nearly a decade later, Bahrami et al.[ 9] performed
an experiment almost identical to that of Sorkin et al.
[10], but they made a different assumption about the
content of the information communicated between
individuals. Noting that a reliable decision (ﬁgure 1)
is one based on a large mean and a small standard
deviation, they suggested that Qodrat’s communicated
conﬁdence in his decision could be deﬁned as the ratio
mQ/sQ. The magnitude of this signed ratio would
correlate with the probability that Qodrat has made
the right decision. The collective decision could then
simply be deﬁned as the sign of the sum of shared
conﬁdences (mQ/sQ) þ (mJ/sJ), giving the group
sensitivity by
sgroup ¼
sQ þ sJ ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p : ð2:2Þ
Bahrami et al.[ 9] dubbed this model the Weighted
Conﬁdence Sharing (WCS) model. Comparison with
Sorkin et al.’s [10] model shows that when sensitivities
are similar (i.e. sJ ¼ sQ), the two decision boundaries
ðmQ=s2
QÞþð mJ=s2
JÞ¼0 and ðmQ=sQÞþð mJ=sJÞ¼0
become identical and the outcome is equivalent to
that seen in multisensory perception. When the indi-
vidual sensitivities are different (say, sQ . sJ),
however, the two models diverge in their predictions.
To demonstrate this, if we rewrite equation (2.2) as
sgroup
sQ
¼
1
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p þ
1
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
sJ
sQ
  
ð2:3Þ
we can see that the expected collective beneﬁt (sgroup/
sQ; i.e. group sensitivity relative to its more sensitive
member) is a linear function of the similarity between
group members’ sensitivities (sJ/sQ). This linear
relationship means that if Jalal’s sensitivity is no
better than approximately 40% of Qodrat’s (sJ/sQ ,
2
1/221   0.4), then—in sharp contrast to Sorkin
et al.’s [10] model—this model predicts that Qodrat
and Jalal together should do worse than the more
sensitive observer (Qodrat) alone (sgroup , sQ).
Bahrami et al.[ 9] tested dyads in a simple percep-
tual decision-making task that involved visual
contrast discrimination (ﬁgure 2). In every trial, indi-
viduals ﬁrst made a private decision about a brieﬂy
viewed stimulus. If their private decisions disagreed,
they were asked to negotiate a joint decision. When
dyad members had similar sensitivities, dyad decisions
were more accurate than those of the better individual.
However, if one observer was much less sensitive than
the other, the dyad failed to outperform the better
member; cf. experiment 2 in the study of Bahrami
et al.[ 9]. Importantly, group performance in these
latter situations was markedly worse than expected
from equation (2.1) but not statistically different
from the predictions of equation (2.2). Mackay’s intui-
tion had once again proved useful: examination of
collective failures suggested that perceptual decisions
and their reliability are not spontaneously communi-
cated separately but instead together in the form of a
ratio. If what Qodrat communicates is the ratio
(mQ/sQ), then Jalal (i.e. the recipient) will be unable
to resolve (mQ) and (sQ) from one another. Conse-
quently, the process of interpersonal communication
involves information loss. But is there a way to avert
or reduce this loss of information?
Previous research suggests that failures of com-
munication are not solely owing to noise and random
errors [14]. A number of systematic egocentric biases
that impair communication have been identiﬁed on
both sides of a verbal exchange. When communicating
their internal intentions verbally, people often overesti-
mate the clarity of their communicated message, as if
their internal states were readily evident, indeed trans-
parent, to their addressee [15]. Similarly, an egocentric
bias afﬂicts the addressee: listeners often interpret the
meaning of what they are told from their own (rather
than the speaker’s) perspective [16].
We hypothesized that if the collective failures
observed by Bahrami et al.[ 9] were a consequence of
egocentric biases that plague face-to-face verbal com-
munication [14], then providing a non-verbal, scalar
system for participants to share information may
remove or reduce these egocentric biases and in turn
improve collective decision-making; especially when
observers have vastly different sensitivities. To test
this hypothesis, we ﬁrst replicated the collective failure
reported by Bahrami et al.[ 9] (experiment 1: verbal
condition). Then we devised a non-verbal conﬁ-
dence-rating/sharing schema to replace face-to-face
verbal communication of decisions while keeping all
other aspects of the experiment constant (experiment
1: non-verbal condition). If egocentric biases in face-
to-face verbal communication were at least partially
responsible for the collective failures in the verbal con-
dition, then the non-verbal conﬁdence rating/sharing
schema employed in the non-verbal condition should
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asymmetric sensitivity.
3. EXPERIMENT 1
(a) Methods
(i) Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate,
graduate and faculty members of Aarhus University,
Denmark. Verbal (V) condition: n ¼ 30, mean age+
s.d. 23+2.5; non-verbal (NV) condition: n ¼ 30,
mean age+s.d. 23.9+2.5. All participants were
healthy male adults with normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. Members of each dyad knew
each other. No participant was recruited for more
than one experiment. The local ethics committee
approved all experiments, and written informed
consent was obtained from all participants.
(ii) Display parameters and response mode
In all experiments, both dyad members sat in the same
testing room. Each viewed his own display. Display
screens were placed on separate tables at a right angle
to each other. The two displays were connected to the
same graphiccard via avideo ampliﬁer splitterand con-
trolled by the Cogent toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.
uk/cogent.php/) for MATLAB (Mathworks Inc).
Each participant viewed an LCD display at a dis-
tance of approximately 57 cm (resolution ¼ 800  
600—Fujitsu Siemens AMILO SL 3220W, 2200) for
which a look-up table linearized the output luminance.
Background luminance was 62.5 Cd m
22 in both dis-
plays. The displays were connected to a personal
computer through an output splitter that sent identical
outputs to both of them. Within each session of the
experiment, one participant responded with the
keyboard and the other with the mouse. Both
participants used their right hand to respond.
Each participant viewed one half of their screen: the
left half of one display for the participant responding
with the keyboard, and the right half of the other dis-
play for the participant responding with the mouse.
A piece of thick black cardboard placed on each dis-
play was used to occlude the half not viewed by each
participant. Two stimulus arrays were presented on
both displays simultaneously, each on one-half of the
display. Control over which one the participants saw
was achieved by using the occluding cardboard.
private
confidence rating
interval 1  interval 2
individual
decisions
made
individual
decisions
declared
group
decisions
required
feedback
first
second
joint
decision?
correct
correct
wrong
second interval
low confidence
zero
first interval
high confidence
verbal
communication
private button
press
non-verbal sharing
of confidence
Figure 2. Stimuli, task and modes of communication. Each trial consisted of two observation intervals followed by private
decisions by each participant. In the verbal communication mode (top box), participants indicated their individual decision
by a button press. In the non-verbal mode (bottom box), participants reported the target interval by dragging a marker to
the left (ﬁrst) or right (second) of the centre and indicated their conﬁdence by the distance of the line from the centre. Indi-
vidual decisions were then announced, and in cases of disagreement, participants either talked to each other (top) or saw each
others’ conﬁdence rating (bottom) in order to reach a joint decision. Then one of the observers (indicated by the colour of the
sentence ‘joint decision?’) announced the dyad decision. Grey, black and white shades correspond to blue, yellow and white
colour codes that were used in the experiments to indicate the participant using the keyboard, the one using the mouse and
the dyad, respectively.
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both experiments. This conﬁguration permitted us to
display stimuli with different levels of noise to partici-
pants in the same dyad. Other stimulus characteristics
(retinal size, luminance, contrast, duration) were iden-
tical for both participants. Moreover, in the NV
condition, the use of a bipartite display allowed us to
assess the participants’ conﬁdence privately (i.e. each
participants only saw his own conﬁdence bar) at the
individual decision stage (see §3a(v)).
(iii) Design and task
In all experiments, a two-Alternative Forced Choice
(2AFC) design was employed (ﬁgure 2). Two obser-
vation intervals were provided. A target stimulus
always occurred either in the ﬁrst or in the second
interval. Participants were instructed to choose the
interval most likely to have contained the target. In
the NV condition, participants rated their conﬁdence
in their decision on a scale from 1 (indicating ‘very
doubtful’) to 5 (indicating ‘absolutely sure’; see
below for a description of the conﬁdence rating
procedure and display).
(iv) Stimuli
The stimulus set displayed in each interval consisted of
sixverticallyorientedGaborpatches(standarddeviation
of the Gaussian envelope: 0.458; spatial frequency:
1.5 cycles deg
21; contrast: 10%) organized around an
imaginary circle (radius: 88) at equal distances from
each other. The target stimulus was generated by elevat-
ingthecontrastofoneofthesixpatches,whichproduced
a contrast oddball. The target location and interval were
randomized across the experimental session. The stimu-
lus duration in each interval was 85 ms. Target contrast
was obtained by adding one of the four possible values
(1.5%, 3.5%, 7.0% or 15%) to the 10% contrast of the
non-target items.
For one participant, in each trial and for each item
in the stimulus array, freshly generated white noise was
added to the grey value of each pixel in each Gabor
patch. The additional white noise was drawn, on
each update, from a random uniform distribution ran-
ging from 0 to 30% of the monitor’s maximum
luminance. The participants did not know about the
addition of noise. The choice of which participant
would receive the noise was determined by a
preliminary test before the experiment (see below).
(v) Procedure
Each trial was initiated by the participant responding
with the keyboard (ﬁgure 2). A black central ﬁxation
cross (width: 0.758 visual angle) appeared on the
screen for a variable period, drawn uniformly from the
range 500–1000 ms. The two observation intervals
were separated by a blank display lasting 1000 ms.
The ﬁxation cross turned into a question mark after
the second interval to prompt the participants to
respond. The question mark stayed on the screen until
both participants had responded. Each participant
initially responded without consulting the other.
In the V condition, participants communicated by
talking to each other. The participant who used the
keyboard responded by pressing ‘N’ and ‘M’ for the
ﬁrst and second interval, respectively; the participant
who used the mouse responded with a left and right
click for the ﬁrst and second interval, respectively.
Individual decisions were then displayed on the moni-
tor (ﬁgure 2), so both participants were informed
about their own and their partner’s choice of the
target interval. Colour codes were used to denote key-
board (blue—illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by black) and
mouse (yellow—illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by dark grey)
responses. Vertical locations of the blue and yellow
text were randomized to avoid spatial biasing. If the
private decisions disagreed, a joint decision was
requested. The request was made in blue if the key-
board participant was to announce the decision and
in yellow if the mouse participant was to announce
the decision. The keyboard participant announced
the joint decision in odd trials; the mouse participant
on even trials. Participants were free to verbally discuss
their choice with each other as long as they wanted.
They were also free to choose any strategy that they
wished. The experimenter was present in the testing
room throughout all experiments to make sure that
the instructions were observed.
In the NV condition, participants did not talk to
each other but instead used a visual schema (ﬁgure 2,
lower panel) to communicate their conﬁdence in their
private decisions. After the two observation intervals,
a horizontal line appeared on the screen with a ﬁxed
midpoint. The left side of the line represented the
ﬁrst interval, the right side of the line represented
the second interval. An additional vertical ‘conﬁdence
marker’ (colour-coded for keyboard and mouse
responses—see above) was displayed in each observer’s
panel. By dragging the conﬁdence marker to the left or
right from centre, the participant reported his choice
about whether the target was in the ﬁrst or second
interval, respectively. The conﬁdence marker could be
moved along the line by up to ﬁve steps on either
side. Each step farther from the centre indicated
higher conﬁdence. We chose this method for obtaining
the decision (left or right side of centre) and the conﬁ-
dence in the decision (distance from the centre) all in
one step rather than having the participants report
them serially. This ensured that the participants’ pri-
vate task involved only one step in all conditions here
and in experiment 2. The participant who used
the keyboard navigated the marker on the conﬁdence
rating scale by pressing ‘N’ or ‘M’ to move the
marker left or right, respectively. He would then con-
ﬁrm his decision by pressing ‘B’ when he thought that
the marker correctly indicated his conﬁdence. The par-
ticipant who used the mouse moved the conﬁdence
marker by pressing left or right button to move the
marker left or right, respectively. He would then press
the middle button when he thought the marker cor-
rectly indicated his conﬁdence. Participants did not
see each other’s conﬁdence rating at this stage. After
the private conﬁdence ratings were made, conﬁdence
values were announced by displaying both participants’
conﬁdence markers along the horizontal line. In the
case of disagreement, a joint decision was requested.
Here, the keyboard participant announced the joint
decision in odd trials, and the mouse participant on
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marker was used with the same ﬁve levels as private
decisions; the marker was not visible to the other par-
ticipant until a joint decision had been made.
Participants did not talk to each other. They were
given earphones to eliminate any meaningful auditory
communication. In addition, a screen was placed
between them to prevent them from seeing each other
if they turned around. The experimenter was present
in the testing room throughout all experiments to
make sure that the instructions were observed.
In all conditions, participants received feedback
either immediately after they made their private
decision, in cases where their private decisions
agreed, or after the joint decision had been made in
cases where their private decisions disagreed. The
feedback either said ‘CORRECT’ or ‘WRONG’.
Feedback was given for each participant (keyboard:
blue—illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by black; mouse:
yellow—illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by grey) and for the
dyad (white). Feedback remained on the screen until
the participant using the keyboard initiated the next
trial (ﬁgure 2). Vertical order of the blue and yellow
was randomized and the dyad feedback always
appeared at the centre.
In both conditions, participants started the exper-
iment with a preliminary, non-interactive session
(eight blocks of 16 trials) that was conducted in
order to identify the participant who would receive
noise in the subsequent main session (see §3a(vi)).
Then, the main experimental session (eight blocks of
16 trials) was conducted.
(vi) Assignment of noise
We determined which participant would receive the
noisy stimuli by ﬁrst testing the participants in an iso-
lated version of the task. In each trial, participants
made a private decision about the target interval and
then received private feedback (i.e. there was no shar-
ing of private decisions and feedback). At the end of
this session, the two participants’ sensitivity (i.e. the
slope of the psychometric function; see §3a(vii)) was
assessed, and the less-sensitive participant was
chosen to receive the noisy stimuli in the experiment
proper. The participants were not informed about
this procedure and were told that the preliminary test
served as practice.
(vii) Data analysis
Psychometric functions were constructed for each
observer and for the dyad by plotting the proportion
of trials in which the oddball was seen in the second
interval against the contrast difference at the oddball
location (the contrast in the second interval minus
the contrast in the ﬁrst; ﬁgure 3a).
The psychometric curves were ﬁt to a cumulative
Gaussian function whose parameters were bias, b,
and variance, s
2. To estimate these parameters, a
probit regression model was employed using the
‘glmﬁt’ function in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc). A par-
ticipant with bias b and variance s
2 would have a
psychometric curve, denoted P(Dc), where Dc is the
contrast difference between the second and ﬁrst
presentations, given by
PðDcÞ¼H
Dc þ b
s
  
; ð3:1Þ
where H(z) is the cumulative normal function,
HðzÞ ;
ðz
 1
dt
ð2pÞ
1=2 exp
 t2
2
  
: ð3:2Þ
As usual, the psychometric curve, P(Dc), corresponds
to the probability of saying that the second interval
had the higher contrast. Thus, a positive bias indicates
an increased probability of saying that the second
interval had higher contrast (and thus corresponds to
a negative mean for the underlying Gaussian
distribution).
Given the above deﬁnitions for P(Dc), we see that
the variance is related to the maximum slope of the
psychometric curve, denote s, via
s ¼
1
ð2ps2Þ
1=2 : ð3:3Þ
A large slope indicates small variance and thus highly
sensitive performance. Using this measure, we quanti-
ﬁed individual participants’ as well as the dyad’s
sensitivity. We deﬁned ‘collective beneﬁt’ as the ratio
of the dyad’s slope (sdyad) to that of the more sensitive
observer (i.e. the one with higher slope, smax). A collec-
tive beneﬁt value above 1 would indicate that the dyad
managed to gain an advantage over its better observer.
Values below 1 would indicate that collaboration was
counterproductive and that the dyad did worse than
its more sensitive member.
The WCS model expressed in equation (2.2) [9]
identiﬁes the dyad’s potential for collective achievement
under the assumption that the members can commu-
nicate their conﬁdence to each other accurately. We
compared the empirically obtained data with this
potential upper bound to see whether and how differ-
ent modes of communication helped or hindered
collective decision-making. We deﬁned an ‘optimality
index’ as the ratio of the dyad’s slope to that predicted
by the WCS model (equation (2.2)).
(b) Results
As demonstrated in ﬁgure 3b, all observers who
received noise showed lower sensitivity (as measured
by the slope of their psychometric function) compared
with their partner who received noise-free stimuli.
This result showed that our noise manipulation effec-
tively rendered one participant’s perceptual decisions
much less reliable than those of the other. Under
such conditions, the WCS model predicts that the
dyad will do worse than the better observer.
(i) Comparison of dyad with the better participant
In the V condition, dyad sensitivity was signiﬁcantly
worse than that of the better observer (one sample
t-test comparing collective beneﬁt with baseline:
t14 ¼ 22.34, p ¼ 0.03; ﬁgure 3c). This result is con-
sistent with the predictions of the WCS model,
which predicted that collective decision-making will
be counterproductive when dyad members have very
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other hand, dyad sensitivity was no worse than the
more sensitive observer (one sample t-test comparing
collective beneﬁt with baseline: t14 ¼ 1.42, p ¼ 0.17;
ﬁgure 3c) showing that groups had been at least as
good as the better observer. Importantly, direct com-
parison of the two conditions showed that collective
beneﬁt was signiﬁcantly greater in the NV condition
(independent samples’ t-test: t28 ¼ 2.61, p ¼ 0.014).
(ii) Comparison of dyad with the Weighted Conﬁdence
Sharing model
The WCS model (equation (2.2)) slightly (but not
signiﬁcantly) overestimated dyad performance in the
V condition (one sample t-test: t14 ¼ 1.25, p ¼ 0.23;
ﬁgure 3d). In the NV condition, the WCS model
showed a trend to underestimate the dyad performance
(one sample t-test: t14 ¼ 1.87, p ¼ 0.08; ﬁgure 3d).
Direct comparison of the two conditions showed that
the optimality index was signiﬁcantly higher in the
NV condition (independent sample t-test: t28 ¼ 2.24,
p ¼ 0.03).
(c) Data summary
The impact of Vand NV communication on collective
decision-making was compared in an experimental
situation, where a previous work had shown that
dyads would perform no better than their constituting
individuals [9]. The results replicate the previous ﬁnd-
ings but go beyond them in several respects: Bahrami
et al. [9] had assigned noise to either one of the dyad
members at random. This trial-by-trial random noise
assignment made it impossible for the observers to
form any stable idea of which dyad member was the
less reliable one in any trial. Here we used a block
design and assigned noise consistently to one member
of the dyad. Thus, the results of the V condition
(ﬁgure 3c,d) show an even more impressive collective
failure: dyad sensitivity was signiﬁcantly worse than
the more sensitive dyad member. A conspicuous differ-
ence in performance did not protect the groups from
suffering counterproductive collaboration.
The results of the NV condition showed that a
non-verbal schema for reporting and sharing decision
conﬁdence (ﬁgure 1, lower panel), to some extent,
could remedy the defective collective decision-
making process and make it more productive; even
though all the low-level conditions, especially the
asymmetric administration of noise, were retained.
This result is consistent with the suggestion that the
collective failure observed in the V condition is not
due to random errors caused by asymmetric noise
but, rather, that direct, verbal communication and its
associated underlying cognitive biases cause the
collective failure.
Having demonstrated the beneﬁcial impact of non-
verbal communication on defective collective
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reported in the second interval is plotted against the contrast difference at the target location (i.e. contrast in the second interval
minus contrast in the ﬁrst). Participants who received clear stimuli (grey) produced steeply rising psychometric functions with
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1356 B. Bahrami et al. Collective failure and metacognition
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)decisions, we asked whether this beneﬁt is general.
Experiment 1 tested collective decisions under asym-
metric administration of noise where we expected no
collective beneﬁt to start with. When dyad members
have access to similarly reliable perceptual infor-
mation, however, direct verbal communication can
indeed confer a robust group beneﬁt that is no less
than expected from the optimal combination of indi-
viduals’ decisions [9,10]. We asked whether the non-
verbal communication of conﬁdence could provide
any additional beneﬁt over and above direct verbal
communication. Indeed, we do not know whether
and how different modes of communication interact
with one another towards collective decisions. In
order to address this question, we used a 2   2
design where collective decision-making was tested
under all four possible combinations of the two
modes of communication (ﬁgure 4).
4. EXPERIMENT 2
(a) Methods
(i) Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate,
graduate and faculty members of Aarhus University,
Denmark. Verbal&non-verbal (V&NV) conditions:
n ¼ 30, mean age+s.d. 24.8+3.5; verbal (V)
condition: n ¼ 30, mean age+s.d. 28.30+6.27;
non-verbal (NV) condition: n ¼ 30, mean age+s.d.
22.2+2; none (N) condition: n ¼ 28, mean age+
s.d. 23.2+2. All participants were healthy male
adults with normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity. Members of each dyad knew each other. No
participant was recruited for more than one exper-
iment. The local ethics committee approved all
experiments and written informed consent was
obtained from all participants. Data from the Vand N
conditions have been reported elsewhere [9].
(ii) Task and design
We employed a 2   2 design to investigate the impact
of verbal communication (two levels: with and with-
out) and non-verbal conﬁdence sharing (two levels:
with and without) on collective decision-making
(ﬁgure 4). Participants communicated verbally in the
V and V&NV conditions. In the NV and V&NV
conditions, participants communicated using the
conﬁdence marker (as in the NV condition of
experiment 1). In the none (N) condition, participants
were not allowed to communicate anything but their
decision (ﬁrst or second interval). The task was
identical to experiment 1 in all other aspects.
(iii) Display and stimuli
Participants received identical visual stimuli and no
observer was given any additional noise. All stimulus
characteristics were identical to the noise-free stimuli
in experiment 1. In conditions that did not involve
non-verbal communication (i.e. V and N conditions),
the bipartite display was not used and both observers
viewed a single stimulus set displayed at the centre of
the entire screen. All other display and stimulus
characteristics were identical to experiment 1.
(iv) Procedure
In all conditions, after one practice block of 16 trials,
two main experimental sessions were conducted.
Each main session consisted of eight blocks of 16
trials. Participants switched places (and thereby
response device) at the end of session one. The partici-
pants set the pace of the experiment’s progress. All
other aspects of the procedure were identical to
experiment 1.
(b) Results
(i) Comparison of dyad with the better participant
We ﬁrst looked at the impact of the mode of communi-
cation on the collective beneﬁt. Following our design
(ﬁgure 4), we employed a 2 (with and without verbal
communication)   2 (with and without non-verbal
conﬁdence sharing) between-subject ANOVAwith col-
lective beneﬁt (sdyad/smax; see experiment 1) as the
dependent variable (ﬁgure 5). The main effect of
verbal communication was highly signiﬁcant (F1,59 ¼
8.4; p ¼ 0.005). Post hoc comparison showed that col-
lective beneﬁt was signiﬁcantly higher when verbal
communication was allowed (i.e. conditions V and
n
o
n
-
v
e
r
b
a
l
verbal
non-verbal non-verbal
verbal none
verbal
Figure 4. Two-by-two design employed in experiment 2.
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t-test: t57 ¼ 2.7, p ¼ 0.008). Comparison with baseline
(see horizontal lines in ﬁgure 5) showed that a robust
collective beneﬁt (i.e. group performance advantage
over and above the better observer) was observed
only where verbal communication is allowed, i.e.
V&NV (ﬁgure 5a; one sample t-test: t14 ¼ 2.47, p ¼
0.026) and V conditions (ﬁgure 5b; one sample
t-test: t14 ¼ 5.38, p , 0.0001). When communication
was strictly non-verbal (NV condition), collective
beneﬁt marginally approached signiﬁcance (ﬁgure 5c;
one sample t-test: t14 ¼ 2, p ¼ 0.064). The main
effect of non-verbal communication was not signiﬁcant
(F ¼ 0.8). Finally, a signiﬁcant interaction was found
between verbal and non-verbal communication
(F1,59 ¼ 6.56; p ¼ 0.013). Post hoc comparison
showed that the interaction was driven by a signiﬁ-
cantly higher collective beneﬁt in the V condition,
where participants communicated only verbally; collec-
tive decision-making was signiﬁcantly less successful
when participants were required to use both verbal
and non-verbal communication (i.e. V&NV versus
V condition; independent sample t-test: t28 ¼ 2.54,
p ¼ 0.016). Compared with no communication (N
condition), the collective beneﬁt accrued from
non-verbal communication (NV) was not signiﬁcant.
(ii) Comparison of dyad with the Weighted Conﬁdence
Sharing model
To compare the dyads’ collective performance with the
upper bound set by the WCS model under different
modes of communication, we applied a similar 2   2
repeated-measure ANOVA to the optimality index
(ﬁgure 6). Similar to the collective-beneﬁt analysis,
the main effect of verbal communication (F1,59 ¼
8.745; p ¼ 0.004) and the interaction between verbal
communication and non-verbal communication
F1,59 ¼ 5.4; p ¼ 0.024) was signiﬁcant.
Post hoc comparison showed that the interaction was
driven by the fact that sharing conﬁdence non-verbally
(NVcondition;ﬁgure6c)allowedthedyadstoapproach
the WCS model signiﬁcantly better than without any
communication (N condition; ﬁgure 6d; independent
sample t-test: t27 ¼ 2.41, p ¼ 0.02). This result demon-
strated that although non-verbal conﬁdence sharing is
not an ideal mode of communication for collective
decision-making (recall that the difference in collective
beneﬁt between the N and NV conditions was not sig-
niﬁcant), communicating ‘something’ is still better
than ‘nothing’ for collective decision-making.
Comparison with baseline showed that when
verbalcommunicationwaspossible(VandV&NVcond-
itions), dyads fulﬁlled the WCS model’s expectations.
With non-verbal communication only (ﬁgure 6c; t14 ¼
2.19, p ¼ 0.04) and without any communication what-
soever, the model prediction exceeded the empirical
dyad performance signiﬁcantly (ﬁgure 6d; t14 ¼ 5.91;
p , 10
–4,p a i r e dt-test).
(c) Data summary
Because dyad members received identical visual
stimuli without any asymmetric noise, collective
beneﬁt was expected in all communicative conditions
(except the N condition). Collective beneﬁt was
robustly obtained when participants communicated
only verbally. Non-verbal communication alone (NV
condition) also showed some beneﬁt: dyad perform-
ance was closer to the optimal upper bound
(predicted by the model) than no communication
(N condition; ﬁgure 6) and a trend was observed for
collective beneﬁt (ﬁgure 5). Surprisingly, when dyad
members communicated by both means, they
obtained less beneﬁt than when they communicated
only verbally (ﬁgure 5a versus b). The beneﬁts of
verbal and non-verbal communication were, so to
speak, sub-additive.
5. DISCUSSION
‘How can we aggregate information possessed by individ-
uals to make the best decisions?’ Condorcet, Galton
and Mackay would have been pleased (or disap-
pointed?) to know that a recent survey (http://bit.ly/
hR3hcS) of current academic opinions has listed this
question as one of the 10 most important issues
facing social sciences in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The
data presented here directly address this question
and the results provide recommendations for enhan-
cing the accuracy of collective decisions under
different circumstances.
Experiment 1 showed that the success of collective
decision-making is severely compromised if the quality
of evidence available to verbally communicating col-
laborators is very different. When participants could
communicate verbally, asymmetric sensitivity of the
team members led to counterproductive collaboration,
even though block-design administration of noise to
one member, but not the other, caused a striking
and persistent difference in the outcome accuracy
between the two collaborators. These results delineate
a critical danger facing collective decisions: too wide a
competence (i.e. in our case, perceptual sensitivity)
gap among interacting agents leads to collaborative
failure even if the gap is conspicuously obvious. If we
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the crowds’, this could be it. However, when partici-
pants could only share their conﬁdence non-verbally,
dyads did signiﬁcantly better than those who had
talked to each other directly, even though the compe-
tence gap was still ﬁrmly in place. The latter ﬁndings
suggest that groups composed of members with very
different competences could avoid major losses (and
perhaps even accrue some collaborative beneﬁt) if a
suitable mode of communication was adopted.
This result is consistent with the ‘egocentric bias’
hypothesis from earlier work [14] suggesting that verb-
ally interacting human agents operate under the
assumption that their collaborators’ decisions and
opinions share the same level of reliability. As long as
this assumption holds (i.e. sQ   sJ), verbal communi-
cation provides an efﬁcient strategy for aggregating
information across individuals and making decisions
that are as good as if the individuals had direct access
to each other’s mental representations (cf. comparison
of equations (2.1) and (2.2)). However, verbal com-
munication backﬁres when the egocentric assumption
does not hold (e.g. sQ   sJ). An important question
for future research is to see what aspect of verbal com-
munication is responsible for upholding the egocentric
bias despite recurring collective failure. Social obligation
to treat others as equal to oneself (despite their conspic-
uous inadequacy) or the urge to contribute (or make a
difference) to the group—despite objectively proving to
be less competent—are two candidate mechanisms.
In experiment 2, in a 2   2 design (ﬁgure 3), we
systematically investigated the impact of verbal com-
munication and non-verbal conﬁdence sharing on
collective decision-making. The results showed that
combining the two modes of communication was
counterproductive. When group members had similar
sensitivity and made decisions based on similarly
reliable information, best (near optimal) performance
was achieved with direct verbal communication.
Imposing an additional non-verbal communication
tool signiﬁcantly reduced the group performance.
Collective beneﬁt was, so to speak, crowded out.
A plausible explanation for this observation may
be found in the literature on introspection and
metacognition. The conﬁdence-ratingschema required
participants to actively introspect about their percep-
tual experience and then graphically indicate their
internal, metacognitive estimate of the reliability of
their decision (i.e. their conﬁdence). This is no mean
feat and indeed a costly cognitive task that requires
allocation of top-down attention [17,18]. In the con-
dition where participants both communicated verbally
and used the conﬁdence-rating schema, it is con-
ceivable that the cognitive load introduced by active
introspection may have interfered with the verbal com-
munication and the collective decision-making process.
Unconstrained verbal communication is perhaps more
automatic and humans may be thought of as ‘natural
experts’ in it. Indeed, a recent study [19] (see also
Overgaard and Sandberg, this issue; [20]) has
suggested that asking people directly about their per-
ceptual experience, rather than having them rate their
conﬁdence, may give a more accurate measure of
their metacognitive awareness. Future research could
show if more practice with active conﬁdence rating
could lead to more automatic, effortless introspection,
which in turn might contribute to enhanced collective
decision-making beyond what is achievable by direct
verbal communication.
When we consider experiments 1 and 2 together, an
intriguing crossover effect is observed: in experiment 1
(with unequal external noise) collective beneﬁt was
higher when participants only share conﬁdence non-
verbally, whereas in experiment 2 (with equal external
noise), verbal communication was clearly superior.
The crossover is not consistent with any explanation
relying on a single mechanism to determine the success
of collective beneﬁt. Egocentric bias inherent in verbal
communication (experiment 1) and cognitive load of
introspection (experiment 2) may be interacting with
one another to give rise to this crossover. This suggests
that the preferred mode of communication of conﬁ-
dence for collective decisions depends on the
similarity of dyad members’ sensitivity. This idea is
illustratedinﬁgure7.Eachpanelshowstherelationship
between similarity (smin/smax) and collective beneﬁt
(sdyad/smax). Data are from parts of experiments 1 and
2 in which communication was exclusively verbal or
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how to maximize collective beneﬁt areclear: when dyad
members are highly similar (smin/smax . 0.6), direct
verbal communication should be used (squares in
ﬁgure 7a). But the substantial beneﬁt from verbal,
direct engagement strongly depends on the similarity
of dyad members’ competence. When observers have
very dissimilar sensitivities—smin/smax , 0.6—direct
communication is disastrous (cross symbols in
ﬁgure 7a). In such situations, non-verbal conﬁdence
sharing communication (triangles in ﬁgure 7b)i s
recommended: it could save the dyad by avoiding the
counterproductive collaboration that is observed with
direct verbal communication.
These results provide algorithmic guidelines for
Qodrat and Jalal (ﬁgure 1) in their effort to maximize
the accuracy of their perceptual judgement as a group
of umpires. However, perhaps with the exception of
refereeing in sports games, collective decisions are
rarely about purely perceptual events amidst uncer-
tainty and noise. In the next section, we will discuss
other domains of social interaction where collective
failures have been reported and compare them with
these ﬁndings.
6. COLLECTIVE FAILURES IN NON-PERCEPTUAL
DOMAINS
Numerous studies in social psychology have documen-
ted instances where group performance is worse than
the performance of the best member. In social loaﬁng
[21], individuals exert less effort in the presence of
others leading to reduced overall group performance.
Thus, social loaﬁng refers to the difference in individ-
ual performance when individuals act in isolation
versus when they act together as a group. An impor-
tant feature of collective situations in which social
loaﬁng has been observed (e.g. the ‘tug of war’
game) is that group members share the responsibility
for possible failures such that no speciﬁc member
could be singled out and held directly responsible for
the group’s misfortune [22].
The collective failures described here and by
Bahrami et al.[ 9] are different from social loaﬁng for
two reasons. First, here dyad members were always
tested in the presence of their partner. The social
setup of the task was identical for dyads that consisted
of similarly sensitive members (who achieved a collec-
tive beneﬁt) and those with dissimilarly sensitive
members (who incurred a collective loss). In none of
the conditions discussed above did the participants
perform the task ‘in isolation’. Even when participants
did not communicate either verbally or non-verbally
(ﬁgures 3, 5d and 6d), they were still sitting in the
same room and shared decisions and made joint
decisions when in disagreement. Interestingly, a
recent ﬁnding has suggested that individual sensitivity
assessed in collaborative settings (i.e. private decision
stage; ﬁgure 2) was superior to individual sensitivity
assessed in non-collaborating setting where two obser-
vers were independently tested simultaneously in the
same room [23]. This individual sensitivity advantage
required the dyad to actively engage in the joint
decision-making and was therefore different from
social facilitation induced by the mere inactive
presence of another person [24]. Second, in all exper-
iments described here, decision outcomes were clearly
stated for the group as well as both participants
leaving little room for sharing the responsibility
for group failures. The participant who led the
group to the wrong decision had, so to speak, nowhere
to hide. This is an important feature of these exper-
iments which shields the group performance against
motivation loss [25].
Groupthink [26] is another case of collective failure.
When individuals are not given the opportunity to
make their own decisions privately, they subsequently
fail to develop and voice their disagreeing opinions.
Interdependence of individual decisions leads to
groupthink [27]. This phenomenon cannot account
for the results reported by Bahrami et al.[ 9] because
individual decisions were always ﬁrst made privately
and independently.
Interpersonal competition [28] is also ruled out as
the observers were not differentially rewarded for their
decisions and there was no incentive for competition.
Finally, the hidden proﬁle paradigm [29–31]i s
another extensively studied case of collective failure
with interesting similarities with and differences from
the cases discussed so far. In 1985, Stasser & Titus
[29] discovered that group interactions tend to focus
oninformationsharedbyeverybody.Thisevenhappens
when some of the interacting individuals have access to
unshared information that is fundamentally relevant—
and provides the best solution—to the joint decision
problem and it is in the interest of all individuals to
share that exclusive information. In other words,
groupinteractionsarebiasedawayfromhiddenproﬁles.
Groups composed of members with dissimilar knowl-
edge proﬁles thus tend to under-exploit their
unshared but available and relevant information.
3
The pattern of collective behaviour in hidden pro-
ﬁle paradigm is consistent with the illusion of
transparency [15] and the egocentric biases [16]i n
interpersonal communication. Indeed, the verbal con-
dition in experiment 1—where one person is much
better than the other (smax   smin)—may involve a
similar situation: the better person might be seen as
having some implicit knowledge (e.g. less noisy stimu-
lus) that the other does not have. However, it is
difﬁcult to explain the collective failures that were
exposed here based on hidden proﬁle paradigm
per se. The marked difference in participants’ accuracy
on a trial-by-trial basis was common knowledge
because the feedback was given to both individuals at
the same time. As such, after a few trials, the asym-
metric reliability of the observers in experiment 1
was not exclusive knowledge at all. Moreover, the det-
rimental impact of asymmetric noise on collective
performance was observed only when dyads communi-
cated directly rather than when they shared conﬁdence
using the visual schema. If the hidden proﬁle paradigm
was responsible for the collective failures, one would
expect not less but, rather, maybe even more collective
failure when communication was minimized and only
non-verbal conﬁdence sharing was used. Nonetheless,
it is possible that verbal communication masks the sen-
sitivity gap, whereas non-verbal communication strips
1360 B. Bahrami et al. Collective failure and metacognition
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making it easier to discard the less-sensitive partici-
pant’s opinion. At present, the only ﬁrm conclusion
on this issue would be that more research is needed
to address these possibilities.
7. THE IMPACT OF INTERACTION ON
ALIGNMENT OF METACOGNITION
What are the qualitative features of sharing and dis-
cussing metacognitive awareness when Qodrat and
Jalal (ﬁgure 1) discuss their opinions? Recently, we
have undertaken linguistic analysis of the conversa-
tions leading to the collective decisions in the verbal
condition of experiment 2 [32]. The results (not
reported here) showed that dyadic conversations
often focus on participants’ conﬁdence in their
decisions. Most groups used more everyday
expressions such as ‘I was not so sure’ and ‘Is a wi t
clearly’. The conversations rarely (i.e. 1 out of 30 ses-
sions studied) led to spontaneous use of explicit
numerical scales to express and compare conﬁdence.
On a trial-by-trial basis, interacting observers tended
to align with each other’s conﬁdence expressions. For
example, if one started the conversation with ‘I did
not see anything’, the other person would most likely
respond with some expression using ‘see’. Over time,
the content of conversations tended to diminish with
practice such that by the end of the experiment,
dyad members had converged to a small, repeatedly
used set of expressions.
These qualitative and quantitative observations [32]
prompted us to wonder if a similar practice-dependent
alignment of conﬁdence could be observed in the con-
ditions of experiment 2, where the conﬁdence rating
schema was employed. To test this hypothesis, we
revisited the data from the NV and V&NV conditions
of experiment 2. For each trial, we calculated the
absolute difference in signed conﬁdence rating (see
§4a) between the two observers and deﬁned alignment
as the inverse of this difference. The results (ﬁgure 8)
showed robust evidence for increased alignment in the
NV condition where participants used only non-verbal
conﬁdence sharing (ﬁgure 8a, grey: one-way ANOVA
with three levels for ﬁrst, middle and last one-third
of trials, F2,28 ¼ 5.38, p , 0.012). These results are
in line with the qualitative ﬁndings about linguistic
alignment of conﬁdence [32] in the verbal condition
of experiment 2 and show that as dyad members
gain experience from their interactions, they tend to
‘describe’ their conﬁdence more similarly using the
conﬁdence rating bar.
However, in the V&NV condition of experiment 2
where participants used both verbal and non-verbal
communication, conﬁdence alignment decreased
(ﬁgure 8a, black: one-way ANOVA, F2,28 ¼ 5.16,
p , 0.013). In other words, conﬁdence judgements
diverged from one another over time. Although use
of the conﬁdence rating schema alone led to alignment
of observers’ metacognitive reports, combining verbal
communication and non-verbal conﬁdence ratings
led to a divergence of conﬁdence ratings.
Direct comparison of the NVand V&NV conditions
using a mixed ANOVA (with two levels for conditions
and three levels for trial bins) supported this con-
clusion with a signiﬁcant interaction (F2,56 ¼ 9.34,
p , 0.0001). These results corroborate the idea
suggested earlier that combining both modes of com-
munication—as in the V&NV condition—leads to an
interference in task performance both at the individual
(as we see here) and at the collective level (as we saw
earlier in the results of experiment 2).
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Figure 8. (a) Alignment of conﬁdence plotted for each time bin consisting of one-third of the trials. Black symbols and curve
correspond to the verbal and non-verbal condition in experiment 2 where both participants communicated verbally and used
the conﬁdence rating schema. Grey symbols and curve correspond to the non-verbal condition in experiment 2, where partici-
pants only communicated via the conﬁdence rating schema. Error bars are 1 s.e.m. across dyads (n ¼ 15). (b) Collective beneﬁt
(sdyad/smax) is plotted for each bin. Horizontal line indicates no beneﬁt (i.e. sdyad ¼ smax). Error bars are 1 s.e.m. across dyads
(n ¼ 15). (c) Correlation coefﬁcients between alignment and collective beneﬁt across dyads for each time bin. For V&NV con-
dition (ii), (Pearson r ¼ [0.08, 20.15, 0.11] and all p . 0.55. For NV condition (i), Pearson r ¼ [0.1, 20.01, 0.6] and p ¼
[0.7, 0.9, 0.01]. Horizontal line indicated zero. Departure from null hypothesis (p ¼ 0.01) is marked by asterisk. Error bars
are 95% CIs for Pearson correlation using Fisher transformation [33]( http://bit.ly/pvDx9).
Collective failure and metacognition B. Bahrami et al. 1361
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)Does alignment of metacognition have any relevance
for collective decision-making? In the conditions of
experiment 2 whereparticipants ratedtheirconﬁdence,
for each dyad, we calculated the collective beneﬁt
accrued within each one-third of the experiment
(ﬁgure 8b). We then tested whether there was any cor-
relation between alignment (ﬁgure 8a) and collective
beneﬁt (ﬁgure 8b) across the dyads. The results
showed that a signiﬁcant correlation (Pearson r ¼ 0.6,
p ¼ 0.01, n ¼ 15) emerged in the last third of the NV
condition (ﬁgure 8c(i)). When participants shared
only conﬁdence rating but did not talk, metacognitive
alignment was associated with collective beneﬁt
suggesting that with enough practice, dyad members
may arrive at and use the alignment to make better
group decisions. In line with our previous observations,
in the V&NV condition (ﬁgure 8c(ii)) where partici-
pants both talked and used the conﬁdence rating
schema, no such relationship ever emerged. This ﬁnd-
ing once again underscores our conclusion that the
combination of both modes of communication was
not productive. Moreover, the fact that the overall col-
lective beneﬁt was not statistically different between the
V&NV and the NV conditions (ﬁgure 5a,c) suggests
that dyads in these two conditions achieved the same
level of performance employing different strategies for
communication and decision rules. More research is
needed to understand the nature of these different
strategies and decision rules.
We also conducted a similar alignment analysis on
the data from the NV condition of experiment 1.
Our results did not show any signiﬁcant ﬁndings
either for the alignment of conﬁdence ratings or for a
correlation between alignment and collective beneﬁt.
We believe that this is most likely owing to the fact
that the number of trials in the interactive phase of
experiment 1 (i.e. 128) was half that of experiment 2;
remember that the effects that we see in ﬁgure 8 did
not emerge before the ﬁnal third of the trials
(171–256). Aside from statistical power issues, how-
ever, we are also reluctant to make a strong prediction
about alignment of conﬁdences in experiment 1 as the
main manipulation in that experiment was to deliver
different and uncorrelated levels of independently gen-
erated visual input noise to the two participants in each
trial, which is expected to weaken any developing/
existing correlation among any outputs from the two
observers including conﬁdence ratings.
8. THE ROLE OF FEEDBACK AND THE
CONTRIBUTION OF SHARED METACOGNITION
TO SOCIAL LEARNING
Could Qodrat and Jalal (ﬁgure 1) achieve any collec-
tive beneﬁt from sharing their opinions and
discussing their disagreements if they never found
out who was actually right and who was wrong? This
is an important question because none of the infor-
mation integration models that we have discussed
here [9,10] assume any role for decision outcomes.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, both
models attempt to explain the dyad behaviour as a
stable, stationary phenomenon with little variability
over time. As useful as these assumptions may be for
simplifying the problem, few would agree that
human group behaviour is—in general—independent
of outcomes and unaffected by social learning.
Arecentstudy[34]examinedthe development ofcol-
lective beneﬁt when feedback was withdrawn from the
dyads. Without feedback, dyads did not initially achieve
any collective beneﬁt. However, with practice dyads
started to exceed their more sensitive member such
that by the end of the experiment, the collective beneﬁt
of interacting dyads with and without feedback was stat-
istically indistinguishable. Thus, knowledge about
outcomes only seemed to accelerate the process of
social learning required for efﬁcient conﬁdence sharing.
Interestingly, feedback is not necessary for optimal
multisensory integration of visual and haptic infor-
mation [35]. Following the standard practice in
psychophysics, those results were obtained from sev-
eral thousands of experimental trials for each
observer to make sure that performance is measured
long after any learning process is ﬁnished. It is, there-
fore, likely that feedback plays a similar accelerating
role in achieving optimality in multisensory inte-
gration. To our knowledge, previous research in
perceptual learning of multisensory integration has
not addressed the role of outcome information on
the speed of learning.
Once again, collective failure is instructive in help-
ing us to phrase the right research question. The
initial failure of the no-feedback groups to exceed
their best member and their subsequent improvements
to the same level as feedback groups pose serious pro-
blems for models of collective decision-making that
assume no social learning [9,10]. An important ques-
tion for future research is to explain the dynamics of
social learning needed to achieve effective collective
behaviour over the course of repeated interactions in
the absence of feedback.
Currently, a number of computational models have
been proposed for social learning based on principles
of associative reinforcement learning [36–38]. The
critical question here is: how could dyad members in
the no-feedback experiment [34] have accomplished
reinforcement learning without any reinforcement
(i.e. without knowing the outcome of their decisions)?
It has been suggested [34] that sharing metacognitive
awareness may provide sufﬁcient information to
replace feedback and reinforce social learning. On
this account, when participants are sincere in their
opinions, the shared metacognitive awareness that
informs the joint decision provides a noisy but still
informative estimate of the true state of the world
which can be used as a substitute for the missing feed-
back about decision outcomes [39]. With a noisy
substitute, the reinforcement learning process could
still happen but would take longer to develop. With
enough practice, learning with and without feedback
would eventually stabilize at similar performance
levels. This account [34] has an interesting, if unex-
pected corollary: a functional role of shared
metacognitive awareness may be to replace missing
reinforcement signals when decision outcomes are
not available (e.g. too complex to estimate or too far
in the future to wait for). Given the abundance of situ-
ations in everyday life where immediate outcomes are
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hypothesis proposed by Bahrami et al.[ 34] offers an
ecologically relevant role for metacognition.
9. NEURONAL, BEHAVIOURAL AND SOCIAL
METACOGNITION
Historically, decision science has focused on three
aspects of every decision: accuracy, reaction time and
conﬁdence [40,41] often assuming that all three orig-
inate from the same underlying process [42]. The
sequential sampling family of models [43] was devel-
oped to account for speed-accuracy trade-offs
observed in two-alternative choice tasks (for a review
see Kepecs & Mainen [44]). The idea in sequential
sampling is that when an observer is presented with
some sensory signal and asked to categorize it as A
or B, s/he keeps sampling the signal and accumulating
the evidence for each alternative. The race between the
two accumulators goes on until evidence collected for
one category hits a predeﬁned boundary determining
the chosen category for the signal. These three com-
ponents, a sensory receptor, an accumulator and a
boundary are the backbone of perhaps the most
widely popular decision-making models in today’s
system neuroscience [45,46].
Sequential sampling models have been extended to
account for decision conﬁdence as the difference in
accumulated evidence supporting each category at the
decision time [47]. Heath [48] showed that such a ‘bal-
ance of evidence’ concept can account for a number of
qualitative features of decision conﬁdence [48]. Recent
works have found neuronal substrates in rodent [49]
and non-human primate [50] brains for decision conﬁ-
dence that closely overlap with the known neural
machinery involved in decision accuracy and speed.
Moreover, the ﬁring patterns of these conﬁdence neur-
ons closely match the predictions of the sequential
samplingmodels.Theselatterﬁndingsthusprovideevi-
dence for the earlier intuition that decision accuracy,
reaction time and conﬁdence arise from the same
latent neuronal process [40]. As such, neuronal encod-
ing of conﬁdence seems to be the cost-free, automatic
by-product of the decision process.
But this view is hardly consistent with what is
known about metacognition at the level of behaviour.
Introspection is cognitively demanding [17] and there-
fore neither automatic nor cost-free. Moreover, if the
conﬁdence and choice processes were one and the
same, then restriction of choice time should systemati-
cally reduce metacognitive accuracy in a manner
parallel to standard speed-accuracy trade-offs. How-
ever, when speed is stressed in a choice reaction time
task, choice accuracy decreases as expected but, para-
doxically, metacognitive accuracy increases [51]. This
suggests that rating conﬁdence may involve some
post-decisional processing distinct from the race-to-
boundary stage (also see Yeung & Summerﬁeld
[52]). A tantalizing prediction arising from this
notion is that, if one repeats our experiments (reported
above) with an emphasis on speed (rather than accu-
racy) in the initial perceptual task, then sharing
(supposedly) more accurate metacognitive awareness
should enhance the collective beneﬁt.
But the data we have reported here (experiments 1
and 2) caution against tightly connecting behavioural
metacognition with shared, social metacognition. Our
results showed that effective sharing of metacognitive
awareness depends on some form of social heuristics
(e.g. egocentric bias) and that the sharing process
seems to be dissociable from and interact with the
cognitive demands of introspection, i.e. behavioural
metacognition. As such, our understanding of metacog-
nition at the levels of neuronal representation, behaviour
and social interaction seem to be disconnected at the
moment calling for future research to (see if it is possible
or meaningful to) bring them together.
Finally, the concepts of conﬁdence in perceptual
sciences and uncertainty in neuroeconomics both
refer to the subjective probability of choice outcomes.
Over the past decade, many studies in the ﬁeld of neu-
roeconomics [53] have decomposed the notion of
uncertainty into ‘risk’ and ‘ambiguity’ and demon-
strated the behavioural and neurobiological correlates
of each [54–56]. When the possible outcomes and
their respective probabilities are known, the decision
is said to be risky. Ambiguity, on the other hand,
refers to situations where the outcomes alternatives
and/or their respective probabilities are unknown. At
ﬁrst glance, conﬁdence in a perceptual two-alternative
forced-choice judgement in the lonely darkness of a
psychophysics laboratory may seem to be closer to
the concept of risk. However, a conspicuous distinc-
tion here seems to be that risk and ambiguity both
refer to subjective probabilities (or their lack of) prior
to choice, whereas conﬁdence refers to subjective prob-
abilities that arise during evidence accumulation and
after the choice has been made. Moreover, whereas
perceptual conﬁdence depends critically on internal
(neural) and external (environmental) sources of
noise, previous works in neuroeconomics have not
used noisy sensory information to manipulate risk or
ambiguity and therefore the connection between
these inter-related concepts is at present unclear but
indeed a very interesting topic for future research
that is just beginning to be investigated [57].
10. CLOSING REMARKS
Two heads are not always better than one. This
paper focused on recent models and empirical ﬁndings
that explored collective failures. These models are
inspired by thinking of collective decision-making as
an ‘information integration’ problem similar to that
of multisensory perception. The intuition obtained
from these theoretical and empirical ﬁndings is that
shared metacognitive awareness (socially communi-
cated conﬁdence in one’s own perceptual decisions
that contributes to collective perceptual decisions)
conveys the strength of the sensory experience and
its reliability inseparably. An important functional
role of such metacognitive awareness may be to substi-
tute missing outcomes in situations where outcome is
necessary for learning but unavailable or impossible
to establish.
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ENDNOTES
1Interestingly, his major case studies, ﬁnancial bubbles and religious
conﬂicts over Jerusalem, do not show any signs of running out of
steam yet.
2The names chosen for the cricket umpires are inspired by Graham
Greene’s [12] The Power and the Glory (Qodrat and Jalal).
3Thomas Bayes (http://bit.ly/f0uTBk) would perhaps have found the
bias for favouring redundant and frequent information only wise and
sensible. In the words of Bellman in Lewis Carrol’s brilliant The
Hunting of the Snark,
‘JUST the place for a Snark!’ the Bellman cried,
As he landed his crew with care;
Supporting each man on the top of the tide
By a ﬁnger entwined in his hair.
‘Just the place for a Snark! I have said it twice:
That alone should encourage the crew.
Just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice:
What I tell you three times is true.’
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